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There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States: the
recovery was very weak and real wages in several sectors rose signiﬁcantly above trend. These data
contrast sharply with neoclassical theory, which predicts a strong recovery with low real wages.
We evaluate the contribution of New Deal cartelization policies designed to limit competition and
increase labor bargaining power to the persistence of the Depression. We develop a model of the
bargaining process between labor and ﬁrms that occurred with these policies, and embed that model
within a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. We ﬁnd that New Deal cartelization
policies are an important factor in accounting for the post-1933 Depression. We also ﬁnd that the
key depressing element of New Deal policies was not collusion per se, but rather the link between
paying high wages and collusion.
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There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United
States. The ﬁrst is that the recovery was weak. After six years of recovery, real output re-
mained 25 percent below trend, and private hours worked were only slightly higher than their
1933 trough level. The second aspect is that real wages in several sectors were signiﬁcantly
above trend, despite the continuation of the depression. The real wage in manufacturing was
about 20 percent above trend in 1939, even though manufacturing hours were substantially
below trend.
These data contrast sharply with neoclassical theory, which predicts a strong recovery
from the Great Depression with low real wages, not a weak recovery with high wages. Theory
predicts a strong recovery because money, banking, and productivity shocks, which were large
and negative before 1933, rebound rapidly after 1933. The pattern of these shocks implies
that employment should have returned to trend rapidly, and that wages should have remained
below trend throughout the recovery.1
Some economists have suggested that the weak recovery was due to New Deal carteliza-
tion policies. These policies permitted industry-wide collusion provided that ﬁrms raised
wages and agreed to collective bargaining.2 Several empirical studies present evidence these
policies increased wages and prices in some sectors during the recovery. However, there is
no theoretical model of these policies to understand how they aﬀected the recovery, nor has
1Lucas and Rapping (1972) conclude that rapid money growth should have returned employment and
output to normal levels by 1935. Cole and Ohanian (1999) conclude that rapid productivity growth should
have returned employment and output to normal levels by 1936, and that wages should have been much lower
than observed. Cole and Ohanian (1999) also conclude that other shocks, including ﬁnancial intermediation
shocks, international trade shocks, and public ﬁnance shocks can’t reasonably account for the continuation
of the Depression.
2See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Alchian (1970), and Lucas and Rapping (1972).there been any systematic quantitative-theoretic analysis of the impact of these policies on
macroeconomic activity.
This paper develops a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model and uses it to
estimate the impact of these policies on employment, output, consumption, and investment
between 1934 and 1939. We ﬁrst develop a model of the intraindustry bargaining process
between labor and ﬁrms that occurred with these policies. We then embed that bargaining
model within the general equilibrium model. We estimate the fraction of the sectors in
the economy aﬀected by these policies, and we treat the other sectors of the economy as
competitive.
We use our model to address two questions about these policies: (1) How distorting
are these policies relative to perfect competition, and (2) how much did they contribute to
the weak recovery? We address these questions by computing the equilibrium path of the
cartel model economy between 1934 and 1939, and comparing it to the equilibrium path of
a perfectly competitive version of the model, and also to the data. We ﬁnd for plausible
parameter values that these policies are very distorting - employment and output in the
cartel model are about 10 to 15 percent below their counterparts in the perfectly competitive
economy. We also ﬁnd that these policies account for about 60 percent of the weak recovery.
The New Deal policies are highly distorting not because of collusion per se, but rather
because the policies linked the ability to collude with raising labor bargaining power. This
link creates an important insider/outsider friction in our cartel model that raises wages above
their competitive levels. In our parameterized model, wages in the cartelized sectors are about
20 percent above trend, as in the data. If wages had not risen, the recovery would have been
much faster.
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data on the recovery for the
1930s. Section 3 discusses the New Deal policies and presents wage and price data from some
industries covered by the policies. Section 4 develops competitive and cartel versions of the
model economy. In section 5, we choose values for the model’s parameters. Section 6 presents
the quantitative analysis. Section 7 describes changes in labor and industrial policies during
the 1940s, and the implications of those changes for our model. Section 8 presents a summary
and conclusion.
2. The Persistence of the Great Depression
This section summarizes data from our earlier paper (Cole and Ohanian (1999), here-
after CO) and identiﬁes three puzzles from this period. Table 1 presents the data: real GNP,
real consumption of nondurables and services (C), real investment (I), including consumer
durables, total factor productivity, (TFP), the real wage in manufacturing, and total private
hours worked. All quantities are divided by the adult (16 and over) population, and all vari-
ables are measured relative to their trend-adjusted 1929 level. CO describes the data and the
detrending procedure in detail.3
CO describe ﬁve empirical patterns between 1933 and 1939: (1) GNP and hours worked
are signiﬁcantly below trend. (2) Consumption is ﬂat, remaining about 25 percent below trend
over the period. (3) Investment is about 50 percent below trend. (4) Productivity returns
to trend by 1936, and remains on trend afterwards. (5) The real wage in manufacturing is
signiﬁcantly above trend.
3Since the theory implies that hours worked are constant along the balanced growth path, we don’t
detrend hours per adult, but rather report them relative to their 1929 levels. Unlike CO, we detrend real
manufacturing wages by the average growth rate in manufacturing compensation during the postwar period
(1.4% per year), rather than the average growth rate of real output per adult (1.9% per year).
3There are three puzzles about these data: (1) Why was the recovery so weak, given
rapid productivity growth? CO show that most U.S. recoveries are rapid, that consumption
recovers smoothly to trend, and that investment substantially exceeds its trend level during
the recovery phase. (2) Why was the real wage in manufacturing so high during a period
of low economic activity?4 (3) Why was labor input so low with such high wages and low
consumption? Competitive forces should have led to an equilibrium with higher labor input, a
lower real wage, and higher consumption. This coincidence of the high wage, low employment
and low consumption suggest some shock seriously distorted the labor market.
There are two reasons why the labor market distortion is due to a domestic shock,
rather than an international shock. First, CO show most countries had rapid recoveries
following the Depression, which is inconsistent with a common international shock. Second,
the U.S. had a small trade share during the 1930s. This indicates that the macroeconomic
eﬀects of international shocks working through U.S. trade ﬂows would be weak.
A successful theory of the recovery should account for the continuation of the De-
pression, the increase in the real wage relative to trend, the lack of competition in the labor
market, and should be based on a domestic shock. We develop a model driven by a domestic
shock that reduces competition in labor and product markets - New Deal labor and industrial
policies. We now describe the policies.
4The increase in the real wage during the recovery is not due to imperfectly ﬂexible wages and unanticipated
deﬂation, as has been suggested for the downturn of 1929-1933. Between 1933 and 1939, both nominal wages
and the price level increased. Since employment grew after 1933, the wage increase is not easily explained by
changes in the average quality of workers.
43. New Deal Labor and Industrial Policies
Wages and prices in several sectors of the economy rose considerably in mid-1933,
and remained high through the decade. Several researchers have argued that the NIRA was
responsible for high wages and prices between 1933 and 1935. In this section, we brieﬂy
describe NIRA policies and present some data showing wage and price increases during this
period. We also summarize post-NIRA labor and industrial policies and argue that labor
and industrial policies were responsible for the continuation of high prices and wages between
1935 and 1939.
A. Summary
Reducing competition and raising wages and prices were the main goals of New Deal
industrial and labor policies. There were two phases of policy during the 1930s. Both phases
shared the same objectives of raising wages and prices and used similar approaches to achieve
these objectives.
The ﬁrst policy phase was the NIRA (1933-1935). This policy created rents by limiting
competition and included provisions that allowed labor to capture some of those rents. The
Act explicitly linked the two policy goals of raising wages and prices by suspending antitrust
law only if the industry accepted collective bargaining and immediately raised wages. The
NIRA thus tied industry’s ability to collude with raising wages and accepting provisions that
increased labor’s bargaining power.
The second phase of New Deal policy was adopted after the Supreme Court ruled
the NIRA unconstitutional in 1935. The NIRA policy goals of limiting competition and
raising wages, however, remained. The main labor policy during this phase was the National
5Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which was passed in 1935. The NLRA strengthened several of
the NIRA’s labor provisions, including collective bargaining and union representation. The
main industrial policy was limited enforcement of antitrust law. We will show that there
was little antitrust prosecution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) after 1935, and that the
government openly ignored collusive arrangements in industries that paid high wages.
B. Phase 1 - The NIRA
We begin by describing Roosevelt’s motivation for adopting cartelization policies. Sev-
eral of Roosevelt’s advisors believed that the severity of the Depression was due to excessive
business competition. They believed that competition intensiﬁed during the Depression, and
that high competition reduced prices and wages, and consequently lowered demand and em-
ployment. Several of these advisors had worked as economic planners during World War I,
and argued that the economic policies used during World War I could lift the country out of
the Depression. Roosevelt advisor Hugh Johnson argued that the wartime economic expan-
sion was due to the policy of ignoring the antitrust laws. According to Johnson, this policy
reduced industrial competition and conﬂict, facilitated cooperation between ﬁrms, and raised
wages and output. (See Johnson (1935)).
The Roosevelt administration argued that two changes were required to end the De-
pression: limit competition and raise wages. They believed that limiting competition kept
prices at reasonable levels, which in turn led to higher wages, higher household income, and
higher consumer spending.
6C. Overview of the NIRA
The Act directed ﬁrms and workers in most of the private, non-agricultural economy
to negotiate industry “Codes of Fair Competition” under the guidance of the National Re-
covery Administration (NRA).5 These codes deﬁned the operating rules for all ﬁrms in that
industry. The codes were administered by a code authority, which was often the industry
trade association. Code compliance was assessed by the NRA. The codes had two types
of provisions: labor provisions and trade practice provisions. The labor provisions required
that ﬁrms pay higher wages and accept collective bargaining. Codes of fair competition re-
quired Presidential approval, and approval was granted only if the codes included industry
acceptance of these wage and collective bargaining provisions.6
In return for accepting these labor provisions, the Act suspended antitrust law and
ﬁrms in each industry were encouraged to adopt trade practices that limited competition
and raised prices. The NRA was directed by World War I planner Hugh Johnson. By 1934,
NRA codes covered over 500 industries employing over 22 million workers. Table 2 shows the
share of employment in NIRA-covered sectors as a fraction of aggregate employment. NRA
codes covered 77 percent of private, non-agricultural employment, and 52 percent of total
employment.
5The only private, non-agricultural sectors exempted from the NIRA were steam railroads, non-proﬁto r g a -
nizations, domestic services, and professional services. The text of the codes is contained in U.S. Government
Printing Oﬃce (1933-34).
6In some cases, some of the labor provisions were adopted by industry before codes of fair competition were
written. This was achieved by ﬁrms following Roosevelt’s Re-employment Agreement (PRA) (see Charles
L. Dearing, Paul T. Homan, Lewis L. Lorwin, and Leverett S. Lyon, “The ABC of the NRA”, Brookings,
1934). Industries that followed the agreement paid minimum wages and consequently were permitted to sell
to government agencies.
7Raising Wages - Labor Provisions in the NIRA Codes
Table 3 lists some of the NIRA labor provisions designed to raise wages. All codes
adopted a minimum wage for low-skilled workers, and 93 percent of the codes also speciﬁed
wages for higher-skilled workers.7 For example, about 28 percent of employees worked under
codes with detailed wage schedules that set wage rates for nearly all types of workers. (Lyon
et al - page 348). 19 percent of employees were under codes that either explicitly maintained
skilled pay diﬀerentials relative to low-skilled workers, or were required to make “equitable
adjustments” to wages of skilled workers. Only 7 percent of employees worked under codes
that had no explicit provisions for raising wages for skilled workers.
One element of NIRA wage provisions was equal treatment - employees performing
similar activities were typically paid the same wage. Consequently, codes generally did not
permit diﬀerential wages based on seniority or other criteria. (See for example the Petroleum
Code, Codes of Fair Competition, volume 1, page 151). In our model, this equal treatment
policy will be important for understanding the depressing eﬀects of New Deal policies. This
is discussed in section 4.
R a i s i n gP r i c e s-T r a d eP r a c t i c eP r o v i s i o n si nt h eN I R AC o d e s
Most industry codes included trade practice provisions that limited competition. These
included minimum prices, restrictions on production, capacity, and the workweek, resale
price maintenance, basing point pricing, and open-price systems.8 Table 4 lists some trade
7Wage provisions for higher-skilled labor were not automatic as with the basic minimum wage, but instead
were the product of negotiations. For example, only 28 of the ﬁrst 100 codes included broad wage provisions
for in their ﬁrst draft. However, after negotiations 93 of these ﬁrst 100 codes included wage provisions covering
most workers in the ﬁnal draft signed by Roosevelt.
8Open price systems required that any ﬁrm planning to reduce its price must pre-announce the action to
the code authority, who in turn would notify all other ﬁrms in the industry. Following this notiﬁcation, the
announcing ﬁrm was required to wait a speciﬁc period before changing its price. The purpose of this waiting
8practices and the fraction of codes adopting them. Minimum price was the most widely
adopted provision, and the code authority played a signiﬁcant role in determining minimum
price in many industries. Several codes permitted the code authority to set industry-wide or
regional minimum prices. In some codes, the authority determined minimum price directly,
either as the authority’s assessment of a “fair market price”,9 or the authority’s assessment
of “minimum cost of production”. In some other codes, such as the iron and steel codes and
the pulp and paper codes, the code authority indirectly set minimum price by rejecting any
price that was so low it would “promote unfair competition.”
All these methods of setting minimum prices shared the goal of raising proﬁts. For
example, cost-based minimum prices included payments to capital, including generous depre-
ciation schedules, explicit or implicit rent, royalties, director’s fees, research and development
expenses, amortization, patents, maintenance and repairs, and bad debts. In some codes
there were explicit provisions for proﬁt margins as a percent of cost.10
The NIRA included and permitted policies and practices designed to limit competition
and raise wages. We now turn to examining the eﬀects of these policies on prices and wages.
D. The Eﬀects of the NIRA Codes on Prices and Wages
Prices and wages in many NIRA-covered sectors rose considerably after the NIRA
was passed, and remained at those levels afterwards. The timing of these increases, and the
fact that these increases occurred during a period of depressed economic activity, has led a
period was for the code authority and other industry members to persuade the announcing ﬁrm to cancel its
price cut.
9The coal industry used this principle to set minimum prices.
10The stone industry included a 10 percent proﬁt margin; the concrete ﬂoor industry called for a proﬁt
margin that was a “reasonable percentage” over cost. (See Lyon et al, pp. 589-599).
9number of economists to conclude that the NIRA was responsible for these increases.11 This
subsection summarizes how prices and wages changed during the period that the NIRA was
in eﬀect.
Hawley (1966) argues that the NIRA was particularly eﬀective in the manufacturing
and mining sectors. Table 5 shows prices of aggregate categories of goods in these sectors.
We show these prices throughout the recovery period beginning in 1934, which is the ﬁrst full
year of the NIRA. We measure these prices relative to their levels in 1932, which is the last
year before the NIRA. Unfortunately, there are no oﬃcial NIPA prices for these sectors during
this period. We therefore begin by showing the implicit price deﬂator of ﬁxed investment
goods, which is an aggregate manufactured good, relative to the implicit price deﬂator of
consumer services. This relative price rises about 20 percent during the recovery period.
To evaluate price changes in other manufacturing categories and in the mining sector, we
construct price indexes for the overall manufacturing sector and for the mining sector by
dividing the nominal values of manufacturing and mining output by Kendrick’s (1966) real
measures of manufacturing and mining output, respectively. We then divide these constructed
price measures by the GNP implicit price deﬂator. These constructed relative prices also rise
substantially; the price of manufacturing rises by 23 percent by 1939, and the price of mining
rises by 37 percent by 1939.
Prices in less aggregated categories also rise after the NIRA. Table 6 shows monthly,
industry-level price changes between March 1933, which is before the NIRA was passed, and
June 1934, which is one year after the NIRA was passed. Industry prices rise signiﬁcantly
11See Weintstein (1980), Bernanke (1986), and Romer (1999) for evidence that New Deal policies raised
wages and prices.
10during this period, ranging from 53 percent increases (Petroleum) to 16 percent increases.
(Iron and Steel).
Wages also rose during the New Deal. Table 1 showed that aggregate manufacturing
wages were high between 1934 and 1939. Table 7 shows that disaggregated wages also rose.
The table shows that monthly, industry-level wage rates rose signiﬁcantly between March
1933 and June 1934.
These data indicate that the NIRA raised some prices and wages signiﬁcantly, and
kept them high.12 The continuation of these high prices and wages stands in contrast to the
view of some historians that the NIRA became ineﬀective shortly after the Act was passed.
Instead, the continuation of high prices and wages is consistent with the views of Hawley
(1966) and Weinstein (1980). Hawley reports that overall code compliance was high among
large ﬁrms and in concentrated industries. Weinstein also reports compliance was high among
large ﬁrms - he notes that about 75 percent of complaints about labor provision violations
came from just 25 codes consisting almost entirely of small ﬁrms.13
The issue of code compliance is important, since the fraction of the economy that was
eﬀectively cartelized during the NIRA plays a role in our quantitative analysis. We return to
this issue in section 5.
12Additional evidence that the codes led to collusion is that consumer groups and government purchasing
agencies quickly registered complaints with the NRA about high prices and identical bids. There was par-
ticular concern over the frequent intervention of code authorities to raise prices. These complaints led to
the appointment of an independent board, directed by Clarence Darrow (of Skopes trial fame) to investigate
industry collusion. The board concluded that the codes did indeed promote collusion, and suggested that
most of the minimum price provisions be eliminated.
13For detail about compliance with the NIRA, see Galvin, Reinstein, and Campbell (1936), and Sims
(1936).
11E. Phase 2 - Post-NIRA Labor and Industrial Policies
On May 27, 1935 the Supreme Court ruled that the NIRA was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power14. In this section, we describe post-NIRA New Deal industry
and labor policies, and argue that these policies continued to keep prices and wages high.
Post-NIRA Policy
Roosevelt and his advisors continued to believe that raising wages and limiting com-
petition was the key to economic recovery. Congress passed new legislation that continued
and strengthened the NIRA labor provisions and increased labor’s bargaining power. Al-
though the government could no longer suspend the antitrust laws, the government appeared
to continue the NIRA industrial policy of encouraging industry cooperation by limited and
selective enforcement of antitrust law.
The NIRA goal of increasing labor bargaining power continued with The National
Labor Relations (NLRA) Act (1935). The NLRA gave workers the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representation that had been elected by worker majority. It pro-
hibited management from declining to engage in collective bargaining, discriminating among
employees based upon their union aﬃliation, or forcing employees to join a company union.
The Act also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce the rules
of the NLRA and enforce wage agreements. The NLRB had the authority to directly issue
cease-and-desist orders. (see Mills and Brown 1950, p. 29 for a description of the NLRA).
The NLRA is widely considered to be a key factor in helping labor organize and
14The Schecter Poultry Corporation was convicted of violating wages and hours provisions under the Live
Poultry Code. The Schecters appealed the conviction and the Supreme Court ruled that the NIRA was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
12form independent unions, which replaced the company unions that were relatively common
before the NLRA (see Taft 1964, Mills and Brown 1950 or Kennedy (1999) p. 290-91). Union
membership rose considerably under the NLRA, particularly after The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Act in 1937; union membership rose from rose from about 13
percent of employment in 1935 to about 29 percent of employment in 1939.15 This increase
in unionization led to a considerable increase in strike activity. Total number of days lost due
to strikes rose from about 14 million in 1936 to about 28 million in 1937.
The NLRA increased labor bargaining power. The Act placed signiﬁcant limitations
on ﬁrm actions against unions, but placed few limitations on labor actions against ﬁrms. For
example, the government tacitly permitted a number of sit-down strikes in the mid-1930s, in
which workers occupied plants and prevented production. The sit-down strike was used with
considerable success against auto and steel producers.16 T h ea c c e p t a n c eo fs i t - d o w ns t r i k e s
stands in sharp contrast to pre-New Deal labor policy, when government injunctions were
frequently used to break ordinary strikes.
The “equal pay” feature of NIRA labor policies, which precluded seniority wage premia
and other discriminatory wage policies, continued in post-NIRA union contracts. Several
authors have described how unions pushed for uniform and standardized wage schedules
during the late 1930s that preserved the NIRA policy of “equal pay for equal work”.17
15It is interesting to note that labor complaints ﬁled with the NLRB rose by 1000 percent immediately
after the Court’s ruling.
16See Kennedy (1999), pp. 310-317.
17Taft and Reynolds (1964) and Ross (1948) describe union bargaining positions in the 1930s. Taft and
Reynolds argue that unions “typically insist on a standard wage schedule which ‘rates the job, not the man”.
They also note that the union movement, especially in smaller organizations, “has forced the abandonment
of personal rates and the development of a systematic wage structure” (Taft and Reynolds p. 171.) Ross
describes how unions “tended to insist on uniform wage rates throughout their jurisdiction” (p. 48), that the
pressure for uniformity was strong in large centralized unions (p. 16), and that “the pressure for uniformity
was almost irresistible” when the government participated in negotiations (p. 52). He also notes that the
13The strengthening of NIRA labor provisions was accompanied by an NIRA-type indus-
trial policy that continued to promote ﬁrm cooperation. Even though the government could
not suspend antitrust law after the NIRA, there is evidence that the government continued to
permit collusion, particularly in industries that paid high wages. Hawley (p. 166) cites FTC
studies from the 1930s that report price-ﬁxing and production limits in a number of indus-
tries following the Schecter decision. The FTC concluded that there was little competition
in many concentrated industries, including autos, chemicals, aluminum, glass, and anthracite
coal. Moreover, Hawley argues that some of the post-NIRA collusion was facilitated by trade
practices formed during the NIRA. For example, he reports that basing-point pricing, which
was adopted explicitly during the NIRA, allowed Steel producers to collude after the Schecter
decision. In particular, Interior Secretary Harold Ickes complained to Roosevelt that he re-
ceived identical bids from steel ﬁrms on 257 diﬀerent occasions between June 1935 and May
1936 (Hawley, p. 360-64). In one instance the Interior Department received bids that were
not only identical but 50 percent higher than foreign steel prices (Ickes, p. 466). This price
diﬀerence was large enough under government rules to permit Ickes to order the steel from
principle of “equal pay for equal work” was important among unions in autos, steel, and the electrical industry
(p. 56).
One way that unions ﬂattened wage schedules was by ﬁghting for equal cents per hour raises for all
employees. Taft and Reynolds point to “numerous instances during the 1930s and 1940s in which a union
sought and won an equal cents-per-hour increase for all employees,” rather than an equal percentage increase.
They also report that it was hard to ﬁnd union contracts at that time that did not raise wages, and reduce pay
diﬀerentials, in this fashion (pp. 185-186). Similarly, Ross describes how equal across-the-board pay increases
by the United Auto Workers reduced pay diﬀerences among automobile workers. Both authors indicate that
unions narrowed, rather than widened wage diﬀerentials: “to the extent that unionism has had any net eﬀect
on occupational diﬀerentials, this has almost certainly been in the direction of narrowing them” (Reynolds
and Taft p. 185).
There is complementary work that reports little use of speciﬁc discriminatory practices. For example
Harbison (1939) notes that seniority provisions were not widespread. Contracts in the automotive and rubber
industries make no mention of seniority considerations in wages or promotions, while “standard” agreements
in the steel and electrical industries state that seniority will be taken into account for promotions if all other
factors like ability and family status are equal.
Taken together, these analyses suggest that the principle of equal treatment continued after the NIRA.
14German suppliers. Roosevelt cancelled the German contract, however, after coming under
pressure from both the steel trade association and the steel labor union.
Despite this apparent collusion among steel producers, the U.S. Attorney General
announced that these producers would not be prosecuted for restraint of trade (Hawley p.
364). Hawley argues that this decision was just one example of a lax pattern of antitrust
prosecution after the NIRA. Of the few cases that were prosecuted by the DOJ after the NIRA,
he notes that several were pursued for alleged racketeering charges, rather than restraint of
trade.18 The number of antitrust case brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) fell from
an average of 12.5 new cases per year during the 1920s, to an average of 6.5 cases per year
during the period from 1935-38.
F. Prices and Wages After the NIRA
Prices and wages remained high after the NIRA was declared unconstitutional. The
continuation of high prices and wages is consistent with the view that the eﬀects of government
policies did not change much after the NIRA. The relative price of manufacturing is roughly
unchanged in 1935 relative to 1934, and rises after 1935. The manufacturing real wage
changes little in 1936, but rises in 1937 and in 1938. The 1937 and 1938 wage increases
roughly coincide with the large increases in unionization and in the number of days lost to
strikes.
Industry-level wage data also show that wages remained high after the NIRA. We
obtained monthly average hourly earnings from Beney (1938) for those industries that had
18New legislation enacted during the mid-1930s is also viewed by some as limiting price competition,
including The Robinson-Patman Act (1936), which was designed to prevent ﬁrms from selling goods at
diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent customers, and The Miller-Tydings Act (1937), which exempted resale price
maintenance contracts from antitrust laws.
15been classiﬁed by the FTC as noncompetitive after the Schecter decision: autos, aluminum,
steel, coal, chemicals, paper, petroleum and glass. We chose these industries because of
the government’s twin objectives of reducing competition and raising wages. If policy was
successful in achieving these objectives, we should observe high wages in these industries.
Table 9 presents the data between December 1936 and December 1937. The data are
measured relative to their values during the last month of the NIRA (May 1935), and are
normalized to be 100 at this date. The speciﬁcm o n t h si nt h eT a b l ew e r ec h o s e nt oa s s e s s
the view of some labor historians that the NLRA became more important after the Court
upheld its constitutionality in April 1937. If this view is correct, wages should have increased
around this time. We therefore present data immediately before (March) and after (May)
the Court’s decision.
These data have two distinguishing features. First, wages in these industries did not
fall after the Schecter decision - they remained at or near their high May 1935 values at the
end of 1936. This pattern is fairly similar to the pattern in aggregate manufacturing wages.
Second, wages in several of the industries rose around the time that the Court upheld the
NLRA (April 1937). Wages in iron/steel rose about 13 percent over the two month period
between March 1937 and May 1937. Wages in both anthracite and bituminous coal rose
about 15 percent over this two month period.19 Wages in autos and machinery rose about
eight percent. This suggests that post-NIRA policy led to higher wages, and that the Court’s
decision upholding the NLRA further raised labor bargaining power.20
19Formal cartelization policies continued in the bituminous coal industry after the NIRA, including the
Guﬀey-Snyder Act and the Guﬀey-Vinson Act. Adopted under the auspices of conservation, these acts
continued some of the NIRA labor and trade policies (see Hawley (1966)).
20Other authors report similar results about the eﬀect of post-NIRA policies on wages. Bernanke (1986,
page 101) studied wage changes during the New Deal, and found “...the expansion of union power after the
16These data show that industries reported to be noncompetitive by the FTC - and not
prosecuted for antitrust violations - continued to pay high wages after the NIRA, and raised
wages around the time of the Court’s NLRA decision. The continuation of high wages in
collusive industries is consistent with the view that the link between the ability to collude
and paying high wages persisted.
The sharp increases in manufacturing wages and prices suggests that cartelization
policies had important eﬀects in the manufacturing sector. In the remainder of the paper, we
will treat manufacturing as a cartelized sector. This facilitates our subsequent quantitative
analysis by letting us use some long-run manufacturing data to choose parameter values for
our model, and letting us compare some of the predictions of the model to manufacturing
data from the 1930s.
4. A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with New Deal Policies
We now present our model. The analysis is simpliﬁed considerably by treating the
two phases of the policies - (1) NIRA, and (2) NLRA with weak antitrust enforcement - as a
single policy regime.21 The model speciﬁes that in a subset of industries, workers and ﬁrms
bargain over the wage, and that the ﬁrms can collude over pricing and production if they
reach a wage and employment agreement with their workers.
Wagner Act appears to have had a strong positive impact on earnings, raising weekly earnings by about 10
percent or more in six (of eight) industries.”
21It is worth noting that our treatment of New Deal policy as a single policy regime abstracts from some
policy features. There is evidence that some real wages rose after 1935 as unionization increased. This
pattern is consistent with the view that the NLRA strengthened labor’s bargaining power and that trade
union organization facilitated the use of that power. Accounting for this change in the eﬀect of policy would
complicate our analysis considerably. Another change we do not model is a shift in views regarding antitrust
policy that began around 1938 (see Hawley). We do not model this because antitrust activity does not seem
to increase signiﬁcantly until the 1940s. Since the timing of this change is near the end of the period we
investigate, we also abstract from this issue. We return to this change in antitrust policy in Section 6
17Our model is speciﬁcally designed to assess the macroeconomic aﬀects of a key com-
ponent of New Deal policies - linking the ability to collude to paying high wages. We will
show that this connection between high wages and collusion can lead to substantial worker
bargaining power that drives up cartel wages and prices and drives down employment in both
the cartelized and competitive sectors. To accomplish this, we develop an explicit bargaining
game that captures the main features of New Deal industrial and labor policies. We ﬁrst
describe the basic environment, then describe the perfectly competitive version of the model,
followed by a description of the model with New Deal policies.
Our model abstracts from monetary and ﬁnancial factors, which substantially simpli-
ﬁes our analysis. This abstraction seems reasonable since, as CO note, the money supply grew
substantially after 1933, and banking panics ended shortly after the introduction of deposit
insurance. Both of these developments might be expected to foster a rapid recovery, rather
than have impeded the recovery. Our analysis also abstracts from explaining the downturn
of 1929-33, but rather focuses on what happened after New Deal policies were adopted. By
abstracting from the downturn of 1929-33, our analysis proceeds by assuming that either the
negative shock(s) that caused the downturn no longer depressed the economy after 1933 - as
argued in CO for monetary and ﬁnancial shocks - or that if the eﬀects of these shocks did
continue, that they did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the impact of New Deal policies.
A. Environment
Time is discrete and denoted by t =0 ,1,2,...∞. There is no uncertainty. There is a
representative household whose members supply labor and consume the ﬁnal good. There are
two distinct types of goods: Final goods c a ne i t h e rb ec o n s u m e do ri n v e s t e dt oa u g m e n tt h e
18capital stock. These ﬁnal goods are produced using a variety of intermediate goods. These
intermediate goods are produced using identical technologies with capital and labor.
Technologies
Intermediate goods are distinguished by the sector s =1 ,...,S and industry within
the sector i ∈ [0,1] from which they originate. Our model includes both industry output
and sectoral output because the policies operated at the industry level, and because we will
specify a substitution elasticity across goods at the industry level that diﬀers from that at
the sectoral level.
We denote the output of industry i in sector s by ys(i). All industries in all sectors share
identical constant returns to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas technologies for producing output
from capital and labor. Labor is completely mobile across industries and sectors. Capital
is sector speciﬁc. The level of the capital stock that can be used in sector s in period t is
denoted by Kst, and the initial level of capital at date zero is given by Ks0.
Output for a representative intermediate producer in industry i at date t who rents




where zt denotes the date t level of labor-augmenting technology. The process for zt consists
of two components: a growth component (gt) and a transitory component (ηt), and is given
by
zt =e x p ( gt+ ηt).
Households and Firms know the sequence of the transitory component: {ηt}
∞
t=0 . We assume
19βg<1.
Sectoral output, Yst is a CRS constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of




















This speciﬁcation allows the elasticity of substitution between industry outputs in the same
sector (1 − θ)−1 to diﬀer from the substitution elasticity between the aggregated outputs
across sectors (1 − φ)−1.
B. Competitive Model
We begin by studying the perfectly competitive version of the model without carteliza-
tion policies. In this version of the model, the price of each good is determined competitively.
The numeraire is the ﬁnal good. We denote the date-t price of good i in sector s in terms of
the ﬁnal good as pst(i).W ed e n o t et h ew a g er a t eb ywt, the rental rate on capital in sector
s by rst and the market price of time t ﬁnal goods in terms of time 0 ﬁnal goods by Qt.
We denote by kst(i) and nst(i) the amount of capital and labor rented by the representative
intermediate goods producing ﬁrm in industry i, sector s at time t.
The Household’s Problem
There is a representative household with a unit measure of identical members. Pref-





t [log(ct)+Alog(1 − lt)]. (3)
Individuals work either full-time, or not at all; therefore lt is the number of household mem-
bers working in the market.22 The household owns the capital stock, and chooses levels of










+ Π0 =0 , (4)
kst+1 = xst +( 1− δ)kst (5)
where rt denotes the rental price of capital in period t, wt denotes the wage rate, Qt denotes
the price of goods at date t relative to the price of goods at date 0.a n d Π0 denotes the
present value of its claims on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. We do not model the claims to these proﬁts,
since there is no trading of these claims in equilibrium.
The Intermediate Goods Firms’ Problem
A representative intermediate goods producer in sector s and industry i maximizes





1−γ − wtnst(i) − rstkst(i) (6)
22Our speciﬁcation does not reduce to a representative household whose preferences are linear in the
fraction of individuals working, as in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). Instead we chose this alternative
formulation because it allows us to maintain the representative household construct but generates a more
conservative labor supply elasticity than the linear speciﬁcation.
21The Final Good Firms’ Problem
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁnal goods producer, taking prices of its intermediate inputs as given,



























s denotes the ﬁnal good producer’s demand for the output from industry i in sector







θ−1 − ps(i)=0for all i ∈ [0,1] and s =1 ,...,S (8)
Market Clearing Conditions
















The market clearing condition for ﬁnal goods is
Yt = Ct + Xt,
where Ct denotes aggregate consumption and Xt denotes aggregate investment.
Deﬁning yd
st(i) as the demand for output of ﬁrm i, the goods market clearing condition
for industry output is
y
d
st(i)=yst(i) for all s and i.
Note that the competitive version of this model is just a multi-sector version of the standard
optimal growth model.
22C. The Cartel Model
We construct the cartel model by modifying the competitive model in two ways. First,
we allow a subset of industries to collude, and let the workers and ﬁrms in those industries
bargain over the wage and the number of workers. Second, the household’s time allocation
decision is modiﬁed so that household members may search for a scarce job in a cartelized
industry. This feature generates a dynamic insider-outsider model. While our cartel model
is in the spirit of other insider-outsider models, such as Blanchard and Summers (1986),
Lindbeck and Snower (1988), and Drazen and Gottfries (1994), the speciﬁcf e a t u r e so fo u r
model diﬀer from this earlier work. Modeling the main features of New Deal labor and
industrial policies requires a dynamic general equilibrium model in which employment and
the wage in the cartelized industries are determined in equilibrium as a function of the
bargaining strength of the workers and ﬁrms. The existing models in the literature do not
satisfy these requirements. Lindbeck and Snower’s model is static. Blanchard and Summers’
model imposes an exogenous employment rule that abstracts from modeling employment
changes. Drazen and Gottfries’ model assumes workers have all the bargaining power and
also uses a non-standard production technology. We now describe the cartel model.
The Household’s Problem
Household members either work in the competitive sector, (lft), work in the cartel
sector (lmt) (if the household member already has a cartel job), or search for a job in the
cartel sector (lut). It seems reasonable to assume that households will compete for the rents
from cartel jobs. In our model, households compete for these rents by searching for cartel
jobs. Searching, which consists of waiting for a vacant cartel job, requires the same amount
23of time as working, and incurs the same utility cost as working. If a cartel job vacancy arises,
the job is awarded randomly at the start of the period to an individual who searched the
previous period. We denote υt as the probability of obtaining a cartel job through search in
period t.
We assume that cartel jobs are not permanent: a household member who currently
has a cartel job remains in the cartel the following period with probability π. This job attri-
tion means that a fraction of cartel jobs are randomly vacated each period. This attrition
assumption is important only when the initial stock of workers is relatively high at the time
that the cartel policy is adopted. We discuss this in detail below.

















+ Π0 =0 , (9)
lmt ≤ πlmt−1 + υt−1lut−1, (10)
lt = lft+ lmt + lut,
and (5), where ¯ wt is the cartel sector wage. The household’s income consists of ﬂows of labor
income from the competitive and noncompetitive sectors, rental income from supplying cap-
ital, and date-zero proﬁts (Π0). Equation (10) describes the law of motion for the number of
household members with cartel jobs (lmt). This is equal to the number of household members
who retain their cartel jobs from last period (πlmt−1), plus the number of household members
that obtain vacant cartel jobs from searching the previous period (υt−1lut−1).
24The Labor Market Clearing Conditions
In the cartel model, there are two separate labor markets: market clearing in the com-
petitive sector takes place through a competitive market, while cartel jobs are rationed and
workers search. Denoting labor employed by the competitive intermediate goods producers
by nft, the labor market clearing condition in the competitive sector is lft =( 1− m)nft.
Denoting labor employed in the cartel sector by nmt, the labor market clearing condition in
the cartel sector is lmt = mnmt. Finally, since those who search are randomly selected to join
the cartel sector, υt−1 =( nmt −πnmt−1)/lut−1. (The appendix discusses the determination of
the equilibrium level of υt in detail.)
The Negotiation Game
Our bargaining model is a two-stage negotiation game which is played each period in
each industry in a subset of the sectors in the economy. There are two players: workers and
ﬁrms. In stage one the workers make a wage and employment proposal: (¯ wt, ¯ nt). The ﬁrms
either accept or reject this proposal. If the ﬁrms in the industry accept, they collude and
behave as a proﬁt maximizing monopolist, subject to the constraint that they hire ¯ nt units
of labor at the wage ¯ wt.23 If the ﬁrms reject, they hire labor from the spot market at the spot
market wage, wt. In this case, however, ﬁrms can collude and behave as a proﬁt-maximizing
monopolist only with probability ω < 1. With probability 1 − ω, ﬁrms behave competitively
and thus do not earn any monopoly proﬁts.24
23The monopolist is constrained in hiring labor decision, but they can hire any amount of capital at the
market rental price rt.
24An important assumption in our cartel model is no entry. It is worth noting that there were two important
factors present in the 1930s that impeded entry. First, tariﬀs were high. This increased the cost of importing
substitutes for the cartelized goods. Second, wages were high. Williamson (1968) argues that this can also
be an eﬀective barrier to entry.
25At the beginning of a period, cartelized ﬁrms hire any additional workers randomly
from the pool of searchers from last period. In equilibrium the probability of a searcher
ﬁnding a job is equal to the number of new jobs in the cartelized industries divided by the
number of searchers.25
Symmetry implies we can aggregate the cartelized sectors and also aggregate the com-
petitive sectors. This allows us to work with a two sector model with a cartel sector of size


















The problems of the ﬁnal goods producers and those intermediate goods producers in the
competitive sectors are the same as in the purely competitive model.
The Cartel Problems
We now specify the maximization problems for the ﬁrms and workers in a cartelzied
industries. It is useful to ﬁrst deﬁne the proﬁt function as a function of the wage rate
for monopolist in one of the cartelized sectors. We denote the monopolist’s proﬁtf u n c t i o n
conditional on the wage w, by Πt(w),and the associated optimal employment function by
25If the pool of these searchers is not large enough to cover the number of new jobs, then ﬁrms hire additional
workers randomly from those who choose to work in the current period. If this occurred then there could be
an additional gain from choosing to work, which, in equilibrium, was too small to induce search. This can
arise because search is a discrete choice and hence if the gain to being in the cartel sector was suﬃciently
small then no one would search in the prior period, even if he was assured of obtaining a cartel job in the
current period. We do not discuss this possible case further, since in our quantitative analyses the beneﬁtt o
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, (11)
and Nt(w)=n.26 In a slight abuse of notation we will use Πt(w,n) as the solution to the
monopolist’s maximization problem, when he takes wages and employment as given, and
hires the optimal quantity of capital.
We construct the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game that emerges as the
limit of our bargaining game played a ﬁnite number of periods within an individual industry.
In this case, the ﬁrm’s strategy in equilibrium is to always accept any wage and employment
oﬀer (¯ w,¯ n) that yields a reservation level of proﬁts. We then conjecture that the ﬁrms’
strategy in the inﬁnitely repeated version of this game takes this form, and characterize the
solution to the workers’ decision problem. Finally we show our conjectured reservation proﬁt
strategy for ﬁrms is a best response to the strategy that solves the workers’ problem.
First, consider the ﬁnite period game. Assume that in an individual industry the
workers and ﬁrms bargain for T periods, and that following period T workers and ﬁrms
behaved competitively. Since proﬁts under competition are zero, the ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts
from rejecting the workers’ oﬀer, which we denote as PT, equals the probability of behaving
as a monopolist, ω, multiplied by monopoly proﬁts, ωΠT(wT), where wT denotes the date T
spot market wage in the competitive sector. Thus, the ﬁrms’ sub-game perfect strategy is to
accept any oﬀer which yields proﬁts of at least PT. This implies that the workers’ propose a
wage-employment oﬀer of (¯ wT, ¯ nT) in period T such that ﬁrms earn proﬁts of no more than
26The functions for Πt and Nt also depend upon Y, Ym and rt, but that is captured by the time dependence
of the functions.
27PT. Now consider period T−1. Firms have the same reservation proﬁts t r a t e g yi np e r i o dT−1,
since equilibrium period T proﬁts are independent of their period T − 1 actions. Continuing
backwards in this fashion implies that the ﬁrms’ strategy will be to accept any oﬀer in period




The existing cartel workers’ objective is to oﬀer a wage/employment pair at each date
that maximizes the present discounted value of rents from the cartelized sector.31 This value
depends on the existing stock of workers in the industry at the beginning of the period. We
denote the existing number of workers in the industry at the beginning of the period by n,
and we denote the number of those who actually work in the cartel that period by ¯ n. If ¯ n<n ,
then n − ¯ n of the workers are randomly chosen to leave the industry. Given Pt, the solution
to the cartel workers’ problem is implicitly determined by the following Bellman equation in
which Vt(n) denotes the expected value of being a cartel worker (relative to working in the










[¯ wt − wt + π(Qt+1/Qt)Vt+1(π¯ n)]
¾
(13)
subject to Πt(¯ w,¯ n) ≥ Pt.
31We assume families are large enough to smooth out a family member’s employment risk, but are small
enough to work in only an arbitrarily small fraction of the industries. These assumptions imply that the family
is risk neutral with respect to the employment outcome of any individual family member. Moreover, this
implies that the family does not internalize the aggregate consequences of their actions since the likelihood
of a family member obtaining a cartel job is independent of the actions of the industries in which family
members work.
28This problem accounts for worker attrition in two ways. First, the stock of workers in the
industry at the beginning of next period will be π¯ n. Second, an individual worker discounts
future payoﬀs by the discount factor π(Qt+1/Qt), since the probability that the worker remains
in the cartel is π.
Note that workers face the constraint that their proposal of (¯ w,¯ n) must yield the ﬁrms
their reservation proﬁt level of Pt,which in equilibrium is given by (12). We denote the pair
(w∗
t,n ∗
t) as the maximum possible wage and the associated level of employment that satisﬁes
the minimum proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t .
Definition 1. For each t, deﬁne w∗
t = Π
−1
t (Pt) and n∗
t = Nt(w∗
t)
Note that since Π0
t < 0, limw→∞ Πt(w)=0 , and Pt ≤ Πt(wt) (monopoly proﬁts at the
competitive wage), w∗




τ − wτ)/Qt. We assume that this bound is ﬁnite in each period.
Proposition 1. In problem (13), the optimal policy is such that
(i) Πt(¯ w,¯ n)=Pt
(ii) if n ≤ n∗
t, then ¯ n ≥ n.
(iii) if n∗
t <n≤ Nt(wt) then ¯ nt = n.
(iv) if n>N t(wt), then ¯ n ≤ n.
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that workers always set their oﬀer so that ﬁrms earn their reser-
vation proﬁts. Moreover, if the initial stock of workers is above n∗
t, no new workers are added,
and industry employment decays at the attrition rate of 1 − π until it reaches n∗
t. It is this
29case with relatively high employment that attrition plays a role. Without attrition, employ-
ment would remain permanently at that high level. Alternatively, if employment is below n∗
t,
employment is weakly increasing. We strengthen these results below by showing that if the




Here we verify our conjecture that given workers’ strategy, the ﬁrms’ optimal strategy
is to accept any oﬀer (¯ wt, ¯ nt) that yields proﬁts of at least ωΠt(wt). To do so, conjecture that










Note that this payoﬀ is independent of the number of workers in the industry at the beginning
of period t+1. Next, consider what happens if ﬁrms reject the workers’ oﬀer. With probability
ω they behave as a monopolist hiring labor at the competitive wage wt. In this case their
payoﬀ is Πt(wt)+(Qt+1/Qt)Wt+1. If they reject the workers’ oﬀer, then with probability 1−ω
each individual ﬁrm behaves competitively and a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is 0+( Qt+1/Qt)Wt+1. Thus,
the expected payoﬀ from rejecting the workers’ oﬀer is ωΠt(wt)+( Qt+1/Qt)Wt+1.
Since the ﬁrms’ payoﬀ from accepting the workers oﬀer is Πt(¯ wt, ¯ nt)+(Qt+1/Qt)Wt+1,
the optimal strategy of the ﬁr m si st oa c c e p ta no ﬀer of (¯ wt, ¯ nt) if Πt(¯ wt, ¯ nt) ≥ ωΠt(wt) and
otherwise reject. Since the workers’ optimal strategy is to oﬀer ﬁrms their reservation proﬁt
level, then in equilibrium Wt = ωΠt(wt)+(Qt+1/Qt)Wt+1, which is the date t version of (14).
This veriﬁes our conjecture for both the ﬁrms’ continuation payoﬀ and their optimal strategy.
30Equilibrium Outcomes
Under certain conditions, the workers can attain a payoﬀ equal to the discounted value
of the maximum wage. These conditions are laid out in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If Nt+1(w∗
t+1) ≥ πn∗
t for t ≥ 0 and N0(w∗
0) ≥ nm,−1 then for all t




t (Pt), where Pt = ωΠt(wt), (15)
and the employment level is given by
¯ nt = Nt(¯ wt). (16)
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
Along any balanced growth path the number of workers in an industry remains con-
stant. Thus the conditions of proposition 2 are satisﬁed, and the wage rate in the cartelized
industries is given by (15) and the employment level by (16). It will turn out that in our
transition path analyses the conditions of proposition 2 will be satisﬁe d .T h i si sb e c a u s ew e
set the initial stock of workers in our transition simulations to employment levels from 1933,
which are below the balanced growth path levels.
As long as the conditions of proposition 2 are satisﬁed, then in equilibrium the workers
need only specify the wage in their contract with the ﬁrms since specifying a wage of w∗
t and
allowing the ﬁrms to choose both the quantity of employment and the quantity of capital to
rent will generate the desired level of employment, n∗
t, and leave the ﬁrms at their reservation
proﬁt level.32
32This result is consistent with the fact that between 1933-1939 both the NIRA codes and union contracts
often speciﬁed only the wage and not the employment level. When the initial level of employment is high







w h e r ew eh a v em a d eu so f( 8 ) .
The eﬀects of this cartelization policy on employment and the wage depend on the
relative bargaining power between workers and ﬁrms, and this bargaining power is determined
by the parameter ω, which is the probability that ﬁrms can reject an oﬀer and still collude.
The appendix illustrates this when the economy is on a balanced growth path. For example,
when ω =1 , ﬁrms have all the bargaining power. In this case, P is equal to monopoly proﬁts,
and the cartel chooses the employment level that would arise if the industries in m sectors
were acting as monopolists. For values of ω < 1, the workers have some bargaining power,
and the cartel arrangement depresses employment relative to the monopoly case. As ω → 0,
workers have all the bargaining power. In this case, employment converge to zero. Finally,
we show that for any given ω > 0, as θ → 1, and the industry’s market power disappears,
the cartel economy’s balanced growth path converges to that of the competitive economy.
To understand these results, note that there are two opposing forces aﬀecting the
number of cartel workers. First, the per-worker proﬁts that must be paid to the ﬁrm (Pt/nmt)
increases as nmt falls. This force tends to increase employment. On the other hand, revenue
per worker is maximized by setting employment to zero, and this eﬀect tends to reduce
employment. Since the impact of Pt/nmt declines as Pt falls, the second eﬀect dominates the
enough that the workers want to set ¯ nt >n ∗
t, then the workers need to specify both the wage and the
employment level to force the ﬁrms to their reservation proﬁt level. This implication of our model is consistent
with the observation that in declining industries employment is typically part of the factors being bargained
over.
32ﬁrst eﬀect, and consequently employment and output in this industry tend to zero as Pt → 0.
One remaining issue is monotonicity of transition paths to the balanced growth path.
While we have not proved that the equilibrium sequences in our model monotonically converge
, our model simulations suggest they do. Proposition 2 covers the case where employment
starts at or below the balanced growth path level (n∗
t) .I ts h o w st h a ti fe m p l o y m e n ts t a r t sa t
or below n∗
0 and the sequence n∗
t decreases at a rate less than 1−π, the maximum wage and
minimum employment level are chosen in each period. Propositions 1(ii) and 1(iii) cover the
case when initial employment is above n∗
0and convergence is suﬃciently monotonic. Then the
employment level decays at least at the rate 1 − π down to n∗
t, where it remains thereafter.
This model of New Deal policy sets up a dynamic insider-outsider friction in our model
that has the potential to signiﬁcantly depress employment. The quantitative importance of
the insider-outsider friction depends on the reservation value of the ﬁrm Pt,w h i c hi nt u r n
depends on the probability ω. Decreases in ω lower Pt, and reduce employment by shifting
bargaining power to the workers.
There are two reasons why the cartel model depresses employment: because insiders
maximize per-member proﬁts and because new workers are paid the same wage as the insiders.
As we previously noted, this equal treatment characteristic was also a feature of New Deal
policies and wage agreements during the 1930s. We now turn to choosing parameter values
for the model.
5. Choosing Parameter Values
Many of the parameters of our model also appear in standard equilibrium business
cycle models. We choose values for these common parameters using the same methodological
33approach used in the business cycle literature. The parameters ω,m , and π, however, are
speciﬁc to our model. Our general approach for these non-standard parameters is to either
use conservative values, or experiment and report results across a range of values.
The parameters that are common to other general equilibrium business cycle models
are γ,β,g,A, δ. We choose values for the ﬁrst three of these parameters so that in the
competitive version of the model, along a balanced growth path, labor’s share of income is
70%, the annual real return to capital is 5%, and the growth rate of per-capita output is 1.9%
per year. We set the leisure parameter A so that households work about 1/3 of their time in
the competitive balanced growth path. We set δ =0 .07, which yields a balanced-growth-path
ratio of capital to output of 2.
There are two parameters that govern substitution elasticities between intermediate
goods: θ and φ. The parameter θ governs the elasticity of substitution between goods across
industries within a sector. This substitution parameter also appears in business cycle models
in which there is imperfect competition. In these models, the substitution parameter governs
the mark-up over marginal cost as well as the elasticity of substitution. In this imperfect
competition literature, a mark-up of about 10 percent over marginal cost is typically chosen.
We therefore choose θ =0 .9, which is consistent with this mark-up in a version of our model
with monopoly, but no labor market distortions.
The parameter φ governs the substitution elasticity between goods across the ag-
gregated cartelized and non-cartelized sectors. Since we are treating manufacturing as a
cartelized sector, we use long-run manufacturing data to determine a range of values for this
parameter. The relative price and expenditure share of manufactured goods have both de-
clined in the postwar period. These two trends are consistent with a substitution elasticity
34between manufactured goods and other goods that is less than one. Thus, we consider a unit
substitution elasticity (φ =0 )as an upper bound on this parameter, and we also consider
substitution elasticities of 1/2 (φ = −1) and 1/3 (φ = −2). We found that the results were
insensitive to these diﬀerent values for φ.
There are three parameters that are speciﬁc to our cartel model: m, ω and π.T h eﬁrst
parameter is the fraction of industries in the model economy that are cartelized. The second
parameter is the probability that a ﬁrm in a cartelized industry can act as a monopolist but
pay the non-cartel (competitive) wage. The third parameter is the cartel attrition rate, which
is the probability that a current cartel worker will remain in the cartel the following period.
We conduct the balanced growth path analysis for two values of the parameter m:0 . 2 5
and 0.50. The ﬁrst value is slightly smaller than manufacturing’s share of the economy in
1929. We view this as a conservative value for the cartelized fraction of the economy.33 The
second number is a little less than the share of total employment covered by the NIRA. After
analyzing the eﬀects of these diﬀerent values of m on the balanced growth path equilibrium,
we will choose a single value for this parameter for the transition path analysis.
The parameter ω is the probability that an industry fails to reach an agreement with
labor but still behaves as a monopolist. For the NIRA, this probability corresponds to the
likelihood that a ﬁrm in an eﬀectively cartelized sector could have violated the contractual
labor provisions in their industry code. We conduct the balanced growth path analysis for a
range of values for this probability: .05,.50,1. Recall that ω =1is a model in which labor has
33Hawley’s view (private communication) is that this number is a conservative estimate of the fraction of
the economy that was eﬀectively cartelized during the NIRA. The number is also conservative given the view
that these policies were responsible for raising the manufacturing real wage. Manufacturing accounted for
about 28 percent of output in 1929.
35no bargaining power, and the industries in fraction m of the sectors behave as monopolists.
We call this version of our model the monopoly model. As with the case of the parameter
m,we will choose a single value for this probability for the transition path analysis following
the balanced growth path analysis..
The parameter π is the probability that a cartel worker remains in the cartelized sector.
This parameter tries to capture naturally occurring job separations such as retirement and
disability due to accidents and illness. We choose π =0 .95, which corresponds to an expected
job tenure for a cartel worker of 20 years. We experimented by conducting our analyses for
two diﬀerent values of this parameter which yield average job durations of 10 years and 40
years, respectively. We found that most of the results were not sensitive to these variations.
We now turn to the comparison of the cartel and competitive balanced growth paths.
6. Quantitative Analysis
A. Comparing the Cartel and Competitive Balanced Growth Paths
This section compares the balanced growth paths of the cartel version of the model, in
which fraction m of the sectors are cartelized, to that of the purely competitive model. Table
10 presents for the cartel model aggregate output (y), aggregate employment (n),t h ec a r t e l
(insider) wage (wn), and employment (nm) in the cartel sector divided by their respective
balanced growth path values in the purely competitive economy. The table also presents the
fraction of workers searching for a job in the cartelized sector (s)
The main result is that the cartelization policy depresses aggregate output and employ-
ment if labor has a lot of bargaining power. This is the case when the parameter ω is low. For
example, with m =0 .25 and ω =0 .05, output falls 14 percent relative to pure competition.
36For m =0 .50 and ω =0 .05, output falls about 25 percent relative to pure competition. The
reason that employment and output are so low in these two cases is because the insiders are
able to raise their wages substantially - the wage in the cartelized sector is about 36 percent
above its value in the purely competitive economy for the case of m =0 .25 and ω =0 .05.
The results also show that monopoly per se is not the key depressing factor, but rather it is
the link between wage bargaining and monopoly that raises wages above competitive levels.
In particular, the cartelized wage in the monopoly version of the model (ω =1 )is about the
same as the wage in the purely competitive model, and aggregate output and employment in
the monopoly model are close to their competitive levels. Thus, the cartelization policy is not
very depressing if ﬁrms have most of the bargaining power. This is because ﬁrms maximize
total monopoly proﬁts, while insiders maximize only their own payoﬀs.
The results from Table 10 also show that the impact of the cartelization policy depends
on the fraction of the economy covered by these policies (m). Fixing the value for the
parameter ω and increasing m leads to larger decreases in aggregate output and employment,
and a relatively smaller increase in the cartelized wage.
The cartel policy also depresses employment in the competitive sector. This is due
to two factors: the complementarity factor and the rent-seeking factor. The complementar-
ity factor reduces employment in the competitive sector by reducing the competitive wage
through lower output from the cartelized sector. The rent-seeking factor reduces employment
in the competitive sector by inducing household members to compete for rents from cartelized
jobs. For example, for m =0 .25, ω =0 .05 about 5 percent of those individuals involved in
market activity search for a cartel job. For m =0 .5, ω =0 .05, about 11 percent of workers
search for a cartel job.
37Before conducting the transition path analysis, we need to settle on values for m
and ω. We choose m =0 .32. This value is consistent with two procedures of estimating m.
The ﬁrst is to measure m based on the fraction of the economy that appears to be eﬀectively
carterlized - those sectors that experienced signiﬁcant increases in wages and prices during the
recovery period. Manufacturing and mining are two such sectors. We earlier presented data
showing signiﬁcant increases in wages and prices in both of these sectors, and also summarized
arguments made by Hawley and the FTC that industries in these sectors were behaving
collusively. Treating these two sectors as the only cartelized sectors yields m =0 .32.34 The
second approach to measuring m is based on the view that post-NIRA cartelization was
facilitated by trade unions that bargained with ﬁrms over wages. The share of unionized
private employment in 1939 also implies m =0 .32.35
This value of m may be viewed as a conservative one, since our analysis abstracts from
other cartelization policies of the 1930s. Other policies that may have restricted employment
and output include The Agricultural Adjustment Act, which was enacted to raise farm prices.
This act covered much of the farm sector, which accounts for about 30 percent of employ-
ment in 1929. Other examples of these policies include The Davis-Bacon Act, which required
federally-funded contractors to pay prevailing (union scale) wages and beneﬁts, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which established a minimum wage, overtime pay, and restricted em-
ployment of workers under 18 years of age. Accounting for the eﬀects of these policies could
raise the value of m.
Given m, the parameter ω pins down the cartelized wage along the balanced growth
34Manufacturing accounts for 28 percent of output, and mining accounts for 4 percent of output in 1929.
35This number is the ratio of union workers to total private employment. Nonagricultural employment is
from the Historical Statistics of the United States, and agricultural employment is from Kendrick (1961).
38path. We choose ω based on our estimate that the real wage in manufacturing is 20 percent
above its trend value during the recovery period. We therefore choose ω =0 .10, which
produces a balanced growth path wage in the cartel sector that is 20 percent above the
balanced growth path wage in the perfectly competitive version of the model.
B. Comparing the Equilibrium Paths in the Two Models to the Data: 1934-1939
This section presents the equilibrium paths for the purely competitive version and the
cartel version of our model from initial conditions in 1934 to their respective balanced growth
paths. We then compare the predicted variables from the two models between 1934 and 1939
to the data for those same years. For the cartel model, the cartelization policy is adopted in
1934.
Computing the equilibrium paths requires values for the initial conditions and a time
path for total factor productivity. The competitive model has one initial condition (capital
stock) and the cartel model has two initial conditions (capital stock and the number of
insiders in the cartelized sector). We ﬁnd that the capital stock in 1934 is about 15 percent
below trend. We therefore specify the initial capital stock in each of the two sectors to be 15
percent below the balanced growth path level in the competitive model. We use the number
of workers in the manufacturing sector as the initial stock of insiders in the cartelized sector
in the cartel model. The stock of workers in manufacturing was about 42 percent below its
1929 level. In CO, we found that TFP in the data is signiﬁcantly below trend in 1933, and
recovers back to trend by 1936. To account for the eﬀects of this pattern, we feed in the
observed sequence of TFP values relative to trend between 1934-1936, and then feed in the
trend TFP value thereafter. The TFP numbers relative to trend for 1934-1936 are .926, .966
39and .999, respectively.
With the initial capital stock in the two sectors and the sequence of TFP values, we
compute the perfect foresight transition path for the competitive and cartel versions of our
model. This is done by choosing a terminal date in the future such that the model is on its
respective balanced growth path, and then solving a system of N nonlinear equations in N
unknowns between the initial date (1934) and the terminal date.
We ﬁrst consider the competitive model. Table 11 presents the transition path of the
competitive economy. Our main ﬁnding is that the predicted recovery from the competitive
model diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the actual 1934-39 recovery summarized in Table 1. Predicted
economic activity is too high, and the predicted wage is much lower than the wage in manu-
facturing. In particular, predicted output and labor input are both around their trend levels
by 1936, while actual output and labor input remain about 25 percent below trend. Predicted
consumption recovers nearly to trend by the end of the decade, while actual consumption
remains ﬂat about 25 percent below trend. There is a very large disparity between predicted
and actual investment. Predicted investment recovers very quickly, and is 18 percent above
trend by 1936. In contrast, investment recovers only to 50% of its trend level. The predicted
wage is initially low, and then rises nearly to trend as TFP rises and the capital stock grows.
In contrast, the manufacturing wage is considerably above trend over the 1934-1939 period.
In summary, the predicted equilibrium path from the competitive model, which features a
very strong recovery with a low real wage, diﬀers considerably from the actual path of the
U.S. economy between 1934 and 1939.
We now turn to the cartel model. Table 12 shows output, consumption, investment,
employment, searchers divided by the sum of workers and searchers (S), employment in the
40cartel sector (nm), employment in the competitive sector (nf), the wage in the cartel sector
(wm) and the wage in the competitive sector (wf). The equilibrium path of the cartel model
is similar to the actual path of the economy between 1934 and 1939. We ﬁnd that the cartel
model sheds light on the four major recovery anomalies identiﬁed in Section 2.
The ﬁrst two anomalies are the weak recoveries in output and labor input. Actual labor
input and output rise from their trough levels between 1934-1936 and are then relatively ﬂat
afterwards, remaining about 20-25 percent below trend. The cartel model predicts similar
patterns for these variables. Predicted output and labor input also rise between 1934 and
1936, and are ﬂat afterwards. Predicted output in the cartel model is 14 percent below its
competitive balanced growth path level by 1939, while predicted employment is about 11
percent below its competitive balanced growth path level. Thus, the cartel model accounts
for about 50-60 percent of the post-1933 depression in output and labor input.
There are two reasons why the model predicts labor input and output rise during the
ﬁrst two years of recovery. The ﬁrst reason is that the initial stock of workers in the cartelized
sector in the model is below its steady state cartel level. Since in equilibrium the workers pay
the ﬁrm its reservation value, it is optimal for the small number of incumbent workers to add
new members and expand employment and output. The second reason is that productivity
increases, rising about 8 percent between 1934 and 1936. This increases the ﬁrm’s reservation
proﬁt level in 1935 and 1936, which in turn leads the cartel to add additional workers.
The third recovery anomaly is consumption, which in the data is roughly ﬂat through-
out the recovery, remaining about 25 percent below trend. The predicted pattern of consump-
tion in the cartel model is also ﬂat, rising from 16 percent below its competitive balanced
growth path level in 1934 to 14 percent below in 1939. The model thus accounts for the ﬂat
41pattern in consumption and also accounts for over 50 percent of the post-1933 depression in
consumption.
The fourth recovery anomaly is investment, which in the data rises from 72 percent
below trend in 1933 to about 50 percent below trend in 1939. The cartel model predicts a
much stronger investment recovery - an increase from about 60 percent below its competitive
balanced growth path level in 1934 to 13 percent below in 1939. In subsection D, we return
to the deviation between predicted and actual investment, and discuss one modiﬁcation to
the cartel model that brings predicted investment much closer to the data.
We now turn to discussing some other features of the data and the corresponding
predictions of the model.
The manufacturing wage, which we identify as a cartelized wage in the data, rises from
11 percent above trend in 1934 to about 20 percent above trend at the end of the decade.
The cartelized wage in the model exhibits a similar pattern. It rises from about 15 percent
above its competitive balanced growth path level in 1934 to 20 percent by 1939. While the
parameter ω was chosen so that the balanced growth path wage is 20 percent above the
competitive balanced growth path level, this choice places no restrictions on the time path
of the cartelized wage as it converges to its balanced growth path value. Thus, the model
qualitatively reproduces the time path in the cartel wage over the recovery period. The wage
in the competitive sectors of our cartel model is signiﬁcantly below its competitive balanced
growth path level, despite normal productivity growth. It is 20 percent below its competitive
balanced growth path level in 1934, and remains 17 percent below in 1939. Unfortunately
there is no corresponding wage measure in the data for comparison.
The adoption of the cartel policy in our model generates monopoly rents. It is hard
42to ﬁnd proﬁt measures in the data to compare to these theoretical monopoly rents, but it is
worth pointing out that manufacturing accounting proﬁts rose signiﬁcantly after the NIRA
was adopted, and rose faster than proﬁts in other sectors. Moreover, industrial stock prices
also rose in 1934. This is also consistent with our model.
Our model predicts the fraction of individuals in the market sector who search for a
job. The number of searchers in our model, divided by the number who are either working
or searching, is 11 percent during the early part of the transition, and then declines to
about ﬁve percent. The unemployment rate is one empirical measure of the fraction of
individuals searching. Measured unemployment ﬂuctuated between 16 percent in 1934 to
about 11 percent in 1939.36
Our model also makes diﬀerent predictions about the cartelized and non-cartelized
sectors. In particular, the model predicts that employment and output in the cartelized
sectors falls more than labor input in the non-cartelized sectors. It is diﬃcult to compare
this prediction to the data because it is hard to identify which sectors in the actual economy
were the non-cartelized sectors. Identifying the non-cartelized sectors is further complicated
by the adoption of other policies we abstract from that likely reduced competition in non-
manufacturing sectors, such as the Bacon-Davis Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. Given
36The search rate in our model depends on 3 features: the attrition rate, π, the representative family
construct, and the cost of searching, which we assume is equal to the cost of work. Randall Wright pointed
out that search may be less costly than working, which would raise the fraction of household members who
were engaged in search.
We have also conducted our analysis without job-search in the cartel sector. The results did not change
signiﬁc a n t l y .T h i si sb e c a u s eω determines the wage premium in the cartel sector, which in turn determines
relative output and employment. Since the contribution of search to the overall level of eﬀort is small,
the disutility of working is only slightly eﬀected by dropping costly search, and hence the levels of output
and employment are only marginally higher. For example, in the steady of state of the cartel model that
corresponds to our transition examples; that is, when (m = .32,ω =0 .1,φ = −1), output is 88% of the
competitive level instead of 86%, employment is 90% of the competitive level instead of 89%, however the
cartel wage is about 20 percent above the competitive wage in both cases.
43these limitations, we make a comparison between the manufacturing and mining sectors
and the non-farm economy. We chose this comparison because of data availability and our
assumption that manufacturing and mining were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by these policies. We
compare labor input data for these sectors from both Kendrick and Historical Statistics. Both
sources indicate that manufacturing and mining labor input were somewhat lower in the mid
and late 1930s than total non-farm labor input. Kendrick’s data shows that the average of
manufacturing and mining hours between 1934-39 is about 26 percent below its 1929 value,
and shows the average value for private non-farm hours (which includes these two sectors) is
about 18 percent below its 1929 value. The Historical Statistics data shows that the average
value for manufacturing and mining employment between 1934-39 is about 10 percent below
the 1929 value, while total non-farm employment is about 5 percent below its 1929 value.
Our model also predicts that the relative price of cartelized goods should rise. This
comparison is also diﬃcult to make for the same reasons as above. We therefore compare
the price of investment goods to consumption goods. We also chose this comparison because
of data availability and because of our assumption that the investment goods sector (man-
ufacturing) was cartelized by these policies. Table 5 shows that the relative price of ﬁxed
investment goods rose about 20 percent during the recovery period, and also shows that our
constructed measure of the relative price of manufacturing rose about 20 percent.
We also used our model to compute the welfare cost of the cartel policy. We found that
a permanent 4.9 percent increase in consumption was required to raise the level of discounted
lifetime utility in the cartel transition to that in the competitive transition. This welfare
cost is large relative to the welfare costs of other government policies, such as capital income
taxation (Chari, Christiano, Kehoe (1994)).
44We have also conducted some sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our re-
sults. First, we consider an alternative parameterization in which we assume only a fraction
of the manufacturing and mining sectors are eﬀectively cartelized. Second, we consider an-
other parameterization in which capital goods are produced entirely by the cartelized sector.
Third, we allow for some degree of initial monopolization.
C. Extension 1: Not all of Manufacturing and Mining are Cartelized
Our analysis assumed that all of manufacturing and mining were cartelized, and we
c h o s eav a l u ef o rω so that the cartelized wage was about 20 percent above trend. An
alternative interpretation of these data is that only a fraction of manufacturing and mining
were cartelized, but that the wage in those cartelized industries was high enough to generate
the observed rise in the aggregate manufacturing wage. As a robustness check, we lowered the
fraction of the manufacturing and mining sectors that were eﬀectively cartelized, and chose
ω for this smaller fraction of the economy to maintain a 20 percent increase in the average
cartelized wage in our model.
In this extension, we assumed that 75 percent, rather than 100 percent, of manufac-
turing and mining are cartelized, and chose ω so that the average wage in the two aggregate
sectors remained 20 percent above the level under pure competition. We found very similar
results. Steady state aggregate output in our cartelized economy is 87 percent of its balanced
growth path level in the competitive economy. Similarly, employment is 89 percent of the
competitive level.
45D. Extension 2: Capital Exclusively Produced by the Cartelized Sector
One explanation for the increase in the relative price of capital is that capital goods are
produced largely by industries (e.g. the manufacturing sector) that were eﬀectively cartelized
in the 1930s. This modiﬁcation has important implications for the predicted level of invest-
ment in our cartel model.37
We modify our analysis by assuming that capital goods are produced solely from the







The model is otherwise unchanged.
With investment produced solely from the sectoral outputs of industries i ∈ [0,m], we
need to recalibrate m to maintain the share of cartelized employment equal to .32. Table
13 shows the balanced growth path for this version of the cartelized economy relative to the
balance growth path of the purely competitive model.
This modiﬁcation increases the distorting eﬀects of the cartelization policy. For ex-
ample with ω =0 .75, the cartelized wage is 19% higher than under pure competition, the
policy reduces output about 20 percent relative to pure competition, and reduces investment
about 45 percent below pure competition. This modiﬁcation of our model captures the in-
crease in the relative price of capital goods, and suggests that our benchmark model may
37Another possible explanation is that if capital was industry speciﬁc, then ﬁrms would have a reduced
incentive to invest because of a holdup problem: increasing the capital stock would have lead the workers to
raise their wage demands.
46have understated the depressing eﬀects of New Deal cartelization policies.
E. Extension 3: Introducing Some Monopoly in 1929
Our experiments assumed that the starting point of our analysis (1929) was pure
competition. An alternative view is that there was monopoly in some sectors of the U.S.
economy in 1929, and that the New Deal made it possible for more sectors to collude.
To model this alternative view, we modify our model by assuming there are sub-
industries producing a distinct good within an industry, and that the New Deal policies
allowed collections of producers within an industry to collude, whereas before the Depression
only those within a sub-industry had been able to collude.
We assume there a large number of sub-industries indexed by i on the unit interval,
and that there are a large number of industries within each sector, indexed by j on the unit

















where the diﬀerence between γ and θ determines the additional degree of monopoly power
that an industry cartel enjoys relative to a sub-industry cartel.38
To make this operational, we assume that half as many sectors were behaving collu-
sively prior to 1929 as after 1933, and that the price elasticity they faced changed from -10
38Note the these changes do not change the aggregate production set. In particular, if yjst(i)=y, then
Yst(j)=ym, and hence Yst = y.
47to -9 (which implies that γ = .89).W er e t a i nm = .32, φ = −1,and ω =0 .10.
In this case output starts at 78% of it’s balanced growth path level under partial
monopoly (PM), and rises gradually to 88% of this level by 1939. Consumption is fairly ﬂat,
starting out at 85% of it’s PM level, and rising gradually to 87% by 1939. Investment is
quite depressed, starting out at 47% of PM, but then it rises rapidly to 91% of PM by 1939.
Employment is also depressed, but by less than output, starting out at 86% of PM and then
rising to 92% of PM by 1939. The wage premium starts at 13% above it’s PM level in 1934
and rises to 20% above PM by 1939.39
These results indicate that the basic thrust of our results continue under this variant
of the model, though the impact is somewhat reduced. Of course, assuming the capital was
produced in the cartel sector would increase these eﬀects.
7. Implications of Time Variation in New Deal Policies
For simplicity, our analysis abstracts from time variation in New Deal policies. This
section discusses two changes in these policies and the implications of these changes for our
analysis.
A. The Increase in Labor Bargaining Power and the Downturn of 1937-38
The ﬁrst change we discuss is the relative increase in labor bargaining power in 1937.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA in 1937. This increased union-
ization and the number of strikes substantially in 1937 and 1938. Moreover, State governments
permitted “sit-down” strikes, in which employees took over plants and halted production,
39In this computation we assumed that any initial diﬀerence among the cartelized sectors due to some of
them behaving monopolistically and some behaving competitively was wiped out between 1929 and 1933.
Hence we assume that all of the cartelized sectors have the same level of initial capital in 1934.
48during this period. These changes in unionization and union activity led to signiﬁcantly
higher wages; manufacturing real wages rose about nine percent between 1936 and 1938.
Our cartelization theory predicts that this increase in labor bargaining power should have
increased wages and reduced employment and output during this period. This prediction is
consistent with the fall in output, employment, and investment that occurred between 1937
and 1938.
This bargaining power explanation of the 1937-38 downturn diﬀers from the standard
explanation, which is that the downturn was caused by higher reserve requirements on bank
accounts. CO (1999) note that it is diﬃcult to explain the 1937-38 downturn solely by higher
reserve requirement. If this factor was the sole cause, commercial loan rates and the spread
between lending and borrowing rates should have increased shortly after these changes in
reserve requirements, and output should have begun to decrease shortly after these increases.
In contrast, commercial loan rates and the spread between loan rates and other rates were
roughly unchanged after these increases, and industrial production continued to grow for 14
months after the ﬁrst and largest of these increases. While more work is required to assess
the 1937-38 downturn, our theory raises the possibility that an increase in labor bargaining
power may have been an important contributing factor to the downturn of 1937-38.
B. The Reversal of New Deal Policies and the Wartime Economic Boom
The second change we discuss is the dismantling of these policies during the 1940s
and the eﬀect of this policy reversal on employment and output. The economy expanded
signiﬁcantly during World War II. Our cartel model with permanent New Deal policies and
no other shocks, however, predicts that the economy should have remained depressed. This
49section brieﬂy discusses that the wartime expansion can be reconciled with our cartel model.
This is because the expansion coincided with a considerable increase in antitrust prosecution
and a signiﬁcant weakening in labor’s bargaining power.
By the late 1930s Roosevelt suggested that cartelization may have been a contributing
factor to the persistence of the Depression. Roosevelt appointed Thurman Arnold to direct
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. Under this new leadership, the number of new cases
brought by the DOJ rose from just 57 between 1935-39 to 223 between 1940-44. About 80
percent of these cases were won by the government.40
Labor policy also changed during the 1940s. First, The Supreme Court ruled in 1939
that the “sitdown strike” was unconstitutional. Labor historians view this decision as signiﬁ-
cantly weakening labor’s bargaining power (See Kennedy). Second, collective bargaining was
largely suspended during the War as the National War Labor Board (NWLB) ruled on wage
increases, and largely granted only cost of living increases. Third, strikes by Coal miners dur-
ing the war pushed public opinion and congressional opinion against unions and the NLRA.
By 1947, as the NWLB was disbanded, the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.
This Act weakened labor’s bargaining power by restricting labor’s actions, and by reducing
the original limitations placed on ﬁrms in the original NLRA. Among other changes, the Act
outlawed the closed shop, and gave states the right to outlaw unions shops.
Our model predicts that variations in labor and industrial policies should have aﬀected
the diﬀerence between the wage and productivity, and also aﬀected the level of employment
and output. Table 14 shows that the manufacturing wage relative to manufacturing labor
40See Posner, R.A., “A Statistical Analysis of Antitrust Enforcement,” Journal of Law and Economics
(October 1970) vol. 13, p. 365-420.
50productivity changed between 1929 and 1950. It increased considerably during the Depression
years (1938 compared to 1929), and then decreased considerably during the expansion years
1950 relative to 1939. Our model predicts that this decline is consistent with the changes in
policies that occurred over this period.
While more work is needed to determine how these labor and industrial policy changes
aﬀected macroeconomic activity during World War II, the signiﬁcant change in wartime policy
indicates that our model may be consistent with the wartime economic boom.
8. Conclusion
The recovery from the Great Depression was weak despite rapid productivity growth,
and was accompanied by signiﬁcant increases in real wages and prices in several sectors of
the economy. A successful theory of the recovery from the Depression should account for
persistent low levels of consumption, investment, and employment, the high real wage, and
the apparent lack of competition in the labor market. We developed a model with New Deal
labor and industrial policies that can account for sectoral high wages, a distorted labor market,
and depressed employment, consumption, and investment despite normal productivity.
Our results suggest that New Deal policies are an important contributing factor to
the persistence of the Great Depression. The key depressing element behind these policies
was not monopoly per se, but rather linking the ability of ﬁrms to collude with paying
high wages. Our model indicates that these policies reduced consumption, and investment
about 14 percent relative to their competitive balanced growth path levels. Thus, the model
accounts for about half of the continuation of the Great Depression between 1934 and 1939.
New Deal labor and industrial policies did not lift the economy out of the Depression
51as President Roosevelt and his economic planners had hoped. Instead, the joint policies of
increasing labor’s bargaining power, and linking collusion with paying high wages, impeded
the recovery by creating an ineﬃcient insider-outsider friction that raised wages signiﬁcantly
and restricted employment. The recovery would have been stronger if wages in key sectors
had been lower.
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569. Technical Appendix
This appendix describes details of the model, constructs the balanced growth path
equilibria, presents proofs of the propositions, and shows how the cartel model can be re-
interpreted as a model of a labor managed ﬁrm. We begin with the model details.
The households’ ﬁrst order conditions include the following equations for optimal
choices of consumption, labor input in the competitive sector, investment, labor input in









Qt+1[rs,t+1 +1− δ] − Qt =0 , (19)










where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (9) and ξt is the Lagrangian
multiplier on the market hours constraint (10).
Cartel Job Acquisition
Since there is perfect insurance within the household, (18) and (19) can be used to
solve for the equilibrium probability of receiving a cartel job from searching. Assuming that







τ(¯ wt+τ − wt+τ).
57Thus, the value to a household member of being in the cartel is the expected discounted value
of the cartel wage premium. Combining this expression with the time cost of searching for a





τ(¯ wt+τ − wt+τ)=Qt−1wt−1. (22)
This condition determines the equilibrium probability of ﬁnding a cartel job.
A. The Balanced Growth Paths
We ﬁrst characterize the balanced growth path of the competitive model. We then
characterize the balanced growth path of the cartel model.
The Competitive model:
Conjecture that along the balanced growth path growth path the variables (ct,x t,Y t,Y st,y st(i),w t)
grow at rate g and that the variables (nt,r t,p st(i)) are constant. We will now verify this conjec-
t u r e .T od os o ,w ed e n o t e(ct,x t,Y t,Y st,y st(i),w t) by their detrended level (c,x,y,ys,y s(i),w)
(that is, ct = cgt)a n d(nt,r t,p it) by their time-invariant levels (n,r,pi).







w(1 − n)=Ac (24)
Given the symmetry of the model, ouput in each industry in the two sectors is identical,
or ym(i)=yf(i), and therefore the price of each of these intermediate output in terms of
the ﬁn a lg o o di so n e ,o rps(i)=1 . Moreover, since from symmetry all sectoral variables are
identical and the model essentially collapses to the one sector growth model, and we therefore
dispense with distinction between industries and sectors in much of what follows.



















1−γ − w =0 (25)
(1 − γ)z
γ(n/K(x))
γ − r =0 , (26)





[r +( 1− δ)] = 1 (27)




and the resource constraint is
y = c + x (29)
Equations (24)-(29) yield a simple system of equations that determines (c,w,x,n,r,y)
and also characterize the balanced growth path of the competitive model.
The Cartel Model
The cartel model shares many of the same equations as the competitive model. How-
ever, the model is no longer symmetric. From the consumer’s problem Qt is still given by
(23), and condition (24) still characterizes the relationship between c and w.
59We will denote the output level and the price of intermediate goods (in terms of the
ﬁnal good) produced in the cartel sector by Ym and pm, and those in the competitive sector by
Yf and pf. The output and prices of these two types of intermediate goods will be diﬀerent,
however, since the outputs are growing at the same rate g, the prices will be time invariant.









The conditions determining the employment level nf and capital Kf in the competitive
intermediate goods sectors, (25) and (26), are unchanged, as are those determining the rental
prices from the capital producing ﬁrms problem, and hence rental prices will still satisfy (27).




while the level of sectoral output is given by Ym = mym and Yf =( 1− m)yf. The level of




φ/θ +( 1− m)(yf)
φ/θi1/φ
(33)
and the resource constraint is
Y = c + mxm +( 1− m)xf. (34)
Total level of labor eﬀort is given by
n = mnm +( 1− m)nf + ns (35)
60We now need to characterize the solution to the cartelized intermediate goods produc-
ers. We start ﬁrst with the determination of P. It is easy to see from monopolist’s problem
(11) that from the associated f.o.c.s that the optimal choices by the monopolist for labor, ˜ n














m (zrγ/w(1 − γ))
γ(θ−1) (1 − γ)(zrγ/w(1 − γ))γ
# 1
θ−1








˜ k(zrγ/w(1 − γ))
γ
´θ
− r˜ k − w˜ k(rγ/w(1 − γ))
¾
. (36)
Since the balanced growth path level of employment in the cartel industries is constant at










Since ﬁrms are acting as a monopolist and optimizing with respect to km, then the following
condition must hold
θpm(1 − γ)(znm/km)
γ − r =0 . (38)
The wage rate in the monopolist industry is given by
¯ w =
pm(znm)γk1−γ
m − rkm − P
nm
(39)
61Finally, we can determine the balanced growth path probability of a searcher becoming em-
ployed in the cartel sector, υ, through the balanced growth path analog to (22):
β
1 − πβ
(¯ w − w)υ = w. (40)
Therefore, the number of searchers is
ns =( 1− π)nm/υ. (41)
Equations (24), (27), equations (25), (26) for with respect to (nf,x f), along with (30)-
(41) yield a system of equations with which to determine (c, w, ¯ w, xi,n i,r ,y i,p i,n ,n s,y ,
P, υ) for i = m or f, and thus characterizes the balanced growth path of the cartel model.
When ω =1 , this model is simply a two-sector model in which the fraction m of the
intermediate goods producers are monopolists and fraction 1−m are competitive. To see this
note in this case P is simply monopoly proﬁts, and that from condition (39) that ¯ w = w, and
hence that condition (38) is the same as the monopolist’s f.o.c. with respect to labor . As
ω → 0, the eﬀective wage in the cartel sector is approaching (pm ((znm)γk1−γ
m ) − rkm)/nm =
pmγ(znm)γk1−γ
m , and hence nm → 0. Finally, note that as θ → 1, the market power of the
industry disappears, and condition (38) is the same as the monopolist’s f.o.c. for labor. In
this case, the cartel equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of (i) is by contradiction. If Πt(¯ w,¯ n) >P t, then the workers could raise ¯ w,
keeping ¯ n the same, and raising the value of the objective function.
The proof of (ii) is by contradiction. Assume that ¯ nt <n t, and note that by setting
¯ nt = nt and keeping ¯ nt+1 unchanged, then the workers current return is higher and their
62expected future is unchanged. To see that their current payoﬀ is higher, note that ¯ wt is
higher (given that it is set according to 1(i)) and they receive this return with probability
one. To see that their expected future return is unchanged, note ﬁrst that the likelihood that
an initial worker in period t remained employed in period t+1was (¯ nt/nt)πmin(¯ nt+1/π¯ nt,1).
Under the proposed deviation, there are no layoﬀsi np e r i o dt, but the higher layoﬀsi np e r i o d
t +1just oﬀset this and the probability of working in period t +1for an initial worker in
period t is unchanged by construction. Hence, their future payoﬀ is unchanged, since the
payoﬀ per worker who is employed in period t +1is unchanged. If ¯ nt+1 is chosen optimally
given that the number of initial workers in period t+1is πnt, the future payoﬀ could be even
higher: since Vt+1(πnt) is optimal, Vt+1(πnt) ≥ (¯ nt/nt)Vt+1(πnt).
The proof of (iii) is by contradiction. As in the proof of (ii), consider deviating and
setting employment to nt and the wage according to 1(i). Since the total proﬁts earned by
the workers are Πt(0, ¯ nt) − Pt in period t, we need only show that



























































and therefore the second terms are equal in the
two expressions by construction. Hence we need only show that
Πt(0,n t) − Pt − ntwt
nt
>
Πt(0, ¯ nt) − Pt − ¯ ntwt
nt
, (43)
which follows trivially from the fact that nt ≤ Nt(wt), and the proﬁt function Πt(wt,n t) is
63concave in nt.
The proof of (iv) is similar to (iii). We again need to show that (42) is satisﬁed, and
this follows trivially from the assumption that ¯ nt >N t(wt).
C. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows trivially from the fact that w∗
t is the maximal wage rate in period t,
and that therefore the value of (13) is bounded above by
P∞
t=0 πQt(w∗
t −wt), and this sequence
achieves that bound. The uniqueness of the sequence follows from the fact that Π is strictly
decreasing in w.
D. Labor Managed Firm
We now show that the equilibrium of our cartel model is identical to that which would
prevail under a labor managed ﬁrm. To see this, consider the follow alternative model for
an industry in the cartel sector. In each period, the ﬁrm is operated under the direction of
the remaining workers from the period before, and they face the constraint that they make a
minimum proﬁtp a y m e n tPt to the owners of the ﬁrm. In operating the ﬁrm, the remaining
workers, whose number we again denote by n, decide how many workers to have this period,
¯ n, and how much capital to rent, ¯ k at the rental rate rt. If ¯ n>n ,then new workers are added
from among those searching for work, and if ¯ n<n ,then the fraction ¯ n/n of the remaining
workers are laid oﬀ at the beginning of the period.
We assume that the rest of the model is unchanged: A worker who works this period







64where Yt is aggregate output, Ymt is the sector’s output, and ym(i) is the industry’s output.
We again let Vt(n) denote the remaining per-worker surplus from being a cartel mem-
ber, then the problem of the remaining workers in choosing how to run the ﬁrm this period
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−wt + π(Qt+1/Qt)Vt+1(π¯ n)

    
    
, (44)
where wt denotes the competitive wage which is the opportunity cost of labor. Note that for
comparability the problem is posed in terms of the surplus earned per worker.
Assume for the moment that at the optimum ¯ n>n ,in which case the f.o.c.s on the













































It is straightforward to see that condition (45), which governs the optimal choice of capital is
equivalent to the condition governing the optimal choice in our original cartel model for an
industry that has agreed to hire ¯ n workers at wage ¯ w.
To see that condition (46), governing the optimal choice of labor is also equivalent,

















t+1(π¯ n)π =0 (47)















The f.o.c.s on ¯ n and ¯ w in our the workers’ problem in our cartel problem (13), again












Note that from the envelope condition with respect to the proﬁtf u n c t i o n∂Πt/∂ ¯ w = −¯ n, and
























A similar argument can be made in the case when n ≥ ¯ n.
66Table 1: The Continuation of the Depression (1929 = 100)41
Year GNP C I TFP Wmfg Hprivate
1934 64.4 71.9 27.9 92.6 111.1 68.7
1935 67.9 72.9 41.7 96.6 111.2 71.4
1936 74.7 76.7 52.6 99.9 110.5 75.8
1937 75.7 76.9 59.5 100.5 117.1 79.5
1938 70.2 73.9 38.6 100.3 122.2 71.7
1939 73.2 74.6 49.0 103.1 121.8 74.4
T a b l e2 :S c o p eo ft h eN I R A 42
Employment in NIRA-Covered Sectors as:
% of Private/Non-Farm %o fP r i v a t e % of Total
77% 57% 52%
Table 3: Wage Provisions in the NIRA43
Provision Percent of Codes
Low Skilled Labor: Minimum Wage 100
Skilled Labor: Same Pay-Fewer Hours 47
Skilled Labor: Explicit Wage Schedules 28
Skilled Labor: Adjust Based on Minimum 19
Skilled Labor: No Required Change 7
41Source of data: GNP, consumption, and investment - Historical Statistics. TFP and hours worked:
Kendrick (1961). Manufacturing wages: Hanes (1996).
42Source of data: Lyons et al (p.313) and Kendrick (1961) p. 307.
43Source: Lyon et al (1935).
67Table 4: Common Trade Practice Provisions in the NIRA




Prevent Price Cutting 36
Table 5: The ratio of Fixed Investment to Services Prices
and the Relative Price of Manufacturing and Mining44
(1932=1.00)
Year 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
FI / Ser. 1.16 1.19 1.17 1.22 1.20 1.19
Manufacturing 1.14 1.13 1.17 1.26 1.29 1.23
Mining 1.40 1.27 1.45 1.54 1.47 1.37
44These relative price measures were constructed by creating an implicit price deﬂator from NIPA nominal
output and Kedrick’s real output. The constructed sectoral deﬂator was then divided by the GDP deﬂator
to construct the relative price.











45Source: Lyon et al and Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936, Bulletin 616















46Source: Lyon et al (1935)
70Table 8: Real Wages Relative to Trend47
(1929=100)
Year 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Manufacturing 111.4 111.5 110.8 117.4 122.5 122.1
Bituminous Coal Miners 108.0 115.2 120.3 121.4 125.0 124.9
Farming 59.6 62.0 65.0 69.2 65.4 64.6
47The manufacturing wages are from Haines (1996). The bituminous coal miners wages and the farm wages
(without room and board) are from the Historical Statistics. These wage rates were deﬂated using the GNP
deﬂator, and detrended using the post-war growth rate of real compensation, which is 1.4%.
71Table 9: Monthly Industry Wages Before and After the NLRA Court Decision48
(5/35 = 100)
12/36 3/37 5/37 8/37 12/37
Iron/Steel 108.0 111.3 125.0 125.5 123.4
Machinery 102.6 107.3 113.5 115.8 118.9
Autos 108.1 119.1 124.2 127.4 125.7
Chemical, Petrol., Coal 104.3 105.9 115.9 119.9 118.1
Petroleum Reﬁning 106.3 111.9 121.4 123.1 123.1
Anthracite Coal 102.2 0.959 111.0 112.0 111.9
Bituminous Coal 107.6 106.8 122.4 121.5 117.7
Paper 103.1 104.4 107.9 108.6 111.8
Stone, Clay, Glass 100.9 107.1 111.6 113.4 117.1
Aluminum 109.1 116.4 124.0 126.4 128.5
Food 101.5 106.5 111.7 108.6 114.5
48Source: Beney (1938)
72Table 10: The Cartel Model Steady State Relative
to the Competitive Model Steady State:
m = 0.25
φ ω y n wm nm s
0 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.91 0.00
-1 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.00
-2 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.00
0 0.50 0.94 0.96 1.04 0.82 0.01
-1 0.50 0.94 0.95 1.04 0.87 0.01
-2 0.50 0.95 0.95 1.04 0.89 0.01
0 0.05 0.86 0.90 1.35 0.57 0.04
-1 0.05 0.85 0.88 1.34 0.67 0.05
-2 0.05 0.86 0.87 1.34 0.70 0.06
m = 0.50
φ ω y n wm nm s
0 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.00
-1 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.00
-2 1.00 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.00
0 0.50 0.89 0.92 0.98 0.82 0.02
-1 0.50 0.89 0.92 0.98 0.86 0.02
-2 0.50 0.89 0.91 0.98 0.87 0.02
0 0.05 0.76 0.81 1.18 0.58 0.09
-1 0.05 0.75 0.79 1.16 0.65 0.11
-2 0.05 0.75 0.78 1.15 0.67 0.11
73Table 11. The Equilibrium Path from the Competitive Model
Y C I N W
1934 0.87 0.90 0.73 0.98 0.89
1935 0.92 0.91 0.97 1.01 0.91
1936 0.97 0.93 1.18 1.03 0.94
1937 0.98 0.94 1.14 1.03 0.95
1938 0.98 0.95 1.12 1.02 0.96
1939 0.99 0.96 1.09 1.02 0.97
Table 12. The Equilibrium Path from the Cartel Model
(m = .32,φ = −1,ω =0 .10)
Y C I N S nm nf wm wf
1934 0.76 0.84 0.41 0.82 0.07 0.68 0.89 1.15 0.80
1935 0.79 0.84 0.60 0.84 0.11 0.69 0.91 1.18 0.82
1936 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.06 0.73 0.97 1.19 0.83
1937 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.04 0.73 0.98 1.19 0.83
1938 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.06 0.73 0.97 1.20 0.83
1939 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.05 0.73 0.97 1.20 0.83
74Table 13. Comparing Balanced Growth Paths
with Cartelized Investment Goods49
ω y n wm i
0.200 0.86 0.92 1.09 0.66
0.150 0.84 0.91 1.12 0.63
0.100 0.82 0.89 1.16 0.59
0.075 0.81 0.88 1.23 0.56
Table 14. Manufacturing Wage Relative to Mfg. Productivity
(1929 = 100)50
1938 1947 1950
Wage/Productivity 121.3 109.6 103.8
49In these calculations φ = −1, and m is set so that the share of employment in the sector which is to be
cartel is 32% under pure competition. All the other parameters are the same.
50Source: Constructed from Hanes’ wage data and from Kendrick’s productivity data (output per manhour).
Unfortunately Hanes does not report manufacturing wage data for the War years.)
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